FMIT was intended to be a more focused and more narrowly historical study of 'international thought in the Age of Revolutions' treating the international dimensions of political thought from the Seven Years' War to the Napoleonic Wars. Its planned coverage was both firmly canonical-examining major thinkers such as Rousseau, Smith, Bentham, and Kant-and expansively contextual, dealing with non-canonical genres such as treaty-collections, diplomatic handbooks, and the earliest histories of the law of nations. I then spent much of a year reading my way into contemporary IR theory and looking for points of contact with historical work. I found them particularly in the writings of the so-called 'English School' of IR and in more recent studies in a constructivist and historicist vein, by Duncan Bell, Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, and others. This engagement might explain my choice of the some of the figures and problems treated in FMIT; it certainly helped me to decide that I wanted to intervene into debates in IR, as well as those in history and political theory, and contributed to the rethinking-and ultimately to the dissolution-of my working plan for the book.
My original project may have been too ambitious and it soon exploded as one chapter expanded into a free-standing book (Armitage 2007) , others appeared as separate articles, and I also took it upon myself to promote the emergent field of international intellectual history through other occasional pieces. Deconstruction precedes reconstruction, and after all this centrifugal activity, it seemed wise to collect the scattered fragments to see what they added up to something more than the academic equivalent of Frankenstein's monster. Kimberly Hutchings is accordingly quite correct to say that FMIT is not 'a systematic engagement with specific concepts' but instead 'an eclectic collection of essays'. I am especially grateful to her for providing an excellent roadmap of the book's contents, especially for IR theorists. I was especially delighted that she found FMIT useful to her as an IR theorist and teacher for its aversion to anachronism and its warnings against oversimplification. I am also glad she saw in the book a 'challenge to the eurocentrism of IR'-although this was not something I followed through in detail, it certainly fits with more recent attempts to decenter Europe in accounts of international relations and international law (e.g. Acharya and Buzan 2010; Kayaoğlu 2010; Hobson 2012 and to question the notion of any one teleological story of the advance toward modernity.
I therefore wholeheartedly endorse Hutchings's view that we need 'pluralism' in our intellectual histories of international relations. her own contribution-cannot be projected back onto Locke, who did not doubt the capacities of non-Europeans to be fully rational, whose paternalism targeted the English poor rather than indigenous peoples, and who never followed Kant-at least, the early Kant-into anything that looks like modern racism.
I am therefore skeptical that Locke himself would ever have produced an 'evolutionary defence of the superiority of Europeans'. Some later Lockeans would selectively invoke him to that effect in the Early American Republic or colonial New South Wales, for instance, but the very same arguments were also deployed to defend indigenous property rights (Fitzmaurice 2014) . There are undoubtedly imperial pillars underpinning our current global order (compare Tully 2008), but whether Locke is the culprit on whom we should expend our critique is not so obvious, at least to me.
Nonetheless, despite these slight disagreements, Ypi is surely quite right to insist that historical evidence deployed to critical ends comprises a major reason why the history of international thought should be of pressing concern to political theorists.
Helen Kinsella fortifies this motive for political theorists to engage in historical discussion when she writes approvingly of 'the interference with other things-concepts, categories, assumptions-that international intellectual history represents and foments'.
She contrasts this with Kenneth Waltz's rather more complacent attachment to the 'wonderful literature' represented by the canon of political theory from Plato to Machiavelli and beyond (Waltz and Fearon 2012) . My own desire was and is definitely to be 'disruptive' rather than 'utilitarian,' not to uphold the foundations of modern international thought but to shake them. It is in this spirit that I take Kinsella's account of some of FMIT's oversights so seriously. It is true that the book pays little attention 'to the 7 A linguistically more diverse canon; a wider range of sources; greater attention to gender and the subaltern; even greater intolerance of grand narratives-all these would have made the book better and its message more effective. I would also now view the foundations as more like those of ancient Rome in Freud's famous metaphor from
Civilization and Its Discontents: that is, conceived not as 'a human habitation but as a 8 psychical entity with a similarly long and copious past'. One layer does not replace another; each new building is not constructed from the stones of the ones that came before; but 'all the earlier phases of development continue to exist alongside the latest one. … Where the Coliseum now stands we could at the same time admire Nero's vanished golden house' (Freud 1989: 16-18) . The foundations laid down between the early seventeenth century and the early nineteenth century might be the equivalent of the Domus Aurea; later conceptions of international thought-metropolitan and colonial; supremacist and subaltern; anarchic and utopian-have risen up alongside them like the Coliseum without entirely effacing or erasing them. That may be an unsettling thought for those who believe history is smoothly progressive rather than messily cumulative, but such disruption was the real aim of my book as 'an exercise in how to think rather than what to think' (Wolfson 2013) . I am lucky to have found such a congenial group of interlocutors to carry forward that project of shaking the foundations of modern international thought.
